Paul Ricoeur’s Hermeneutics and Organizational Studies: an alternative perspective on Discourse Analysis

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Abstract
This paper aims to present a reflection on Ricoeur’s hermeneutics showing the methodology of his work as an alternative perspective to the Organizational Studies. Moreover, I argue about the Ricoeur’s hermeneutics ontological status and its connections among the discourse units. The results of this theoretical discussion are presented all along the paper and can be summarized: (i) in an ontological perspective we must find ourselves before explain the world; (ii) in an epistemological perspective there is a dialectic between explanation and understanding; and (iii) in a methodological perspective there is a primacy of the semantic level over the semiotic level.

Introduction
The Discourse has been serving to contemporary organizational studies, both in recurrent and intense ways, as an object of study and analysis tool in many different forms and varied frameworks of analysis. As an object of study, for example, the first reference may be the well-known duality between “discourse versus practice” (e.g., the works of Woodman, 2008; Kallio, 2007; Brandão, 2006) invariably given as the result of empirical investigations that show disharmonies and inconsistencies between the organizational practice and the official organizational discourse, or as result of untangling a symbolic system that reveals an organizational ethos different from the organizational ‘said as such’. But, the discourse analysis has also been served to other research purposes, as in the examples of researches on discourse as a resource in the process of creation a corporate identity (Halsall, 2009; Reynolds et al, 2008); as a mediating element of the relationship between organization and society (Brooks et al, 2009; Nayak et al, 2008), as an element of stigmatization both for exclusion and inclusion individuals or groups in organizations (Bendl, 2008); as a mediating element of organizational practices, including control practices and power relations in its various forms and manifestations (Marshak et al, 2008; Carrieri et al, 2002; Maguire, 1999; Costa, 2007; Saraiva et al, 2004; Peci et al, 2006); as a resource in the process of construction or the legitimacy of identities and subjectivities in the organizational environment (Smith et al, 2008; Driver, 2007; Musson et al, 2007; Bergstrom et al, 2006; Doolin, 2002, Saraiva et al, 2004); as a mythic narrative (Ogbor, 2000); and even as a way to identify the strategic scope of the organization (Brooks et al , 2009; Ezzamel et al, 2008).

The organizational discursive arsenal and the possibilities of transformation discourse into an object of investigation do not end with the cited examples above. Notwithstanding, the discourse has become a legitimate object of research in organization theory which raises reflections about appropriate theoretical and methodological treatment to its particularities. It is this sort of reflection that is proposed in this markedly exploratory paper; a reflection that revolves around an initial question: “is it possible to reach a hermeneutic interpretation of organizational phenomena?”, that is, from a specific Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutics, which rescues the discourse from its structural eclipse (the primacy of langue over the parole) and expands it, placing it as central aspects of being-in-the-world understanding. The discourse in these Ricoeur’s terms (and consequently narrative and text) is, moreover, the world to be understood that is set before of being: “to interpret is to explicate the type of being-in-the-world unfolded in front of the text” (Ricoeur, 2008, p.65). Hence, the initial question places above might be replaced to another: it is possible a Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of being for the purpose of an organizational narratives interpretation?

Initially, is useful to show that Ricoeur (1977, p.17) proposes that hermeneutics is the “theory of operations of understanding in their relation to the interpretation of texts”, which
reveals to reader the answer to that initial inquiry is plausibly positive. But this simplistic
definition of hermeneutics and the initial response require, of course, a number of
explanations. From this *doctrine in a clause* stems at least two complex fundamental
implications which will be used, furthermore, as a small guide to this study: (i) the unity of
the discourse is the sentence; the sentence is an event that is guided by a given virtual
symbolic universe and get a universal character thanks to its propositional content. The act of
saying something, that is, the intentionality of speaker takes us necessarily to the second
implication, i.e., there is a (ii) dialectical relationship between explanation and understanding.
The propositional content of the sentence gives the speech its scientific object status while the
dialectical relationship between explanation and understanding gives hermeneutics its
ontological status.

Thus, this paper is intentionally divided as follows: the first part is devoted to the
analysis of the sentence as a constituent of the discourse; the polysemic characteristic of the
language leads to a second part, which investigates the symbol and metaphor as well as
constituents of speech; a third and final part sets out the speech – through the dialectic tension
between explanation and understanding – as the object *par excellence* of hermeneutics both as
an interpretation theory and hermeneutic ontology.

**The unity of the speech: the sentence**

The sentence is not the simple sum of the words that composes it. It is a new entity, a
particular object with a particular meaning. The words are, in fact, its constituent parts, and
sure it is possible to decompose the phrase in these units, but inside it there is the
*propositional content* which takes the sentence into a specific science called *semantics*. The
words and signs are related to another particular science called *semiotics*: “the object of
semiotics - the sign - is merely virtual. Only the sentence is actual as the very event of
speaking. This is why there is no way of passing from the word as a lexical sign to the
sentence by mere extension of the same methodology to a more complex entity” (Ricoeur,

This initial distinction is important in two aspects: first, because according to Ricoeur
(1976) the fundamental problem of language revolves around this fundamental distinction
between semantic and semiotics; and second, because this distinction is a result of a
breakthrough on the theory of interpretation promoted by Ricoeur over the structural
linguistic problem, which is, in fact, the substitution of Saussurre’s notion of *langue* and
*parole* by these two sciences (semantic and semiotic), which also rescues the speech as an
important object for the humanities and social sciences from it structuralism obsolescence. In
structuralism, the *langue* is a set of linguistic codes belonging to a synchronic-time system,
while *parole* is the diachronic use of this system, that is, the message created from the
possibilities of the *langue* (SAUSSURRE, 1959). The message is lost in time, is contingent
and evanescent, while the language code is a model that can be abstracted for analysis. To
structuralism the system of codes’ *langue* has scientific priority over the *parole*.

The advance of structural linguistics throughout the universe of analysis of social
phenomena subdued speech as a valid and scientific object. As a methodological
consequence, it suspended three important elements that comprise the discourse phenomena:
the message, the event, and the intention. On the other hand, it elevated the status of the code,
the system and the structure as mains concerns in linguistics and even other fields. In
anthropology, for example, the structural model of analysis resulted in a radical division
between the ethnographic work (collection and classification of data) and ethnological work
(construction of structural models on the data collected) (Pegino, 2006). Even the narrative,
which is seen as a long speech, must necessarily lead to a structural model: If an object of
study, e.g. any society, does not build its own conjectures about the systemic phenomena that
pervade it, the ethnological work of building a structural model of analysis is facilitated. On the other hand, if this same society develops narratives in the form of “conscious representations”, rationalizing and/or interpreting that such phenomenon, the anthropologist is faced with the task of understanding the deep structure of these phenomena (Pegino, 2006).

To structuralism the narrative or the speech that a given society or organization make for understand its social live only has scientific value insofar as it helps to build a structural model of analysis. The discourse/speech itself is a worthless object. Structuralism do not sees discourse as a mediating element of interpretation that an individual makes about himself and the world, but a merely receptacle for empirical manifestations of a given system structure. The discourse and interpretations that draw up the specific society's narrative remain evanescent and contingent events, just the deep structures that animate it is universal and a valid scientific object.

But, Ricoeur understand there is a central element in discourse that allows us to rescue it from this “structural eclipse” and raise it to the condition of primary object of a Theory of Interpretation. Such element is the propositional element, and is, moreover, a pillar of his hermeneutics:

(...) An act of discourse is not merely transitory and vanishing, however. It may be identified and re-identified as the same so that we may say it again or in other words. We may even say it in another language or translate it from one language into another. Through all these transformations it preserves an identity of its own which can be called the propositional content, the ‘said as such’. (Ricoeur, 1976, p.21)

This propositional content is composed of a unique identification (one subject) and a predicate (an action attributed to the subject). This predicative function takes the sentence to mediate a relationship between the speaker and the world; it is the speaker who says, intentionally, something. It does so using a system of signs that does not have a real existence, but that only occurs in the discourse itself. In the speech, a single action takes place in a singular time, with a singular intention (not in the sense of a romantic hermeneutics, as will be explained elsewhere in this work), and with a singular intensity. The steps which guide from the sign, the basic unit of language, to the sentence, the basic unit of discourse (Ricoeur, 1976; Ricoeur, 2000) is set as follow:

1 - The system of signs that make up a particular language is purely virtual and is realized and actualized in the act of speech;
2 - The discourse/speech is not only an evanescent event, but is an event that can be signified and re-signified and even translated into another language, which gives it a status of a valid scientific object. The speech is an event indeed; it is learned and understands as a sense;
3 - All significations and re-significations which affect the speech do not change its “identity”, i.e., its propositional content (the “said as such”); moreover, such propositional content preserves the speech from the “excess of meaning”;
4 - The propositional content gives to the speech a universality characteristic because it contains “what is said”. The speech has a predicative function;
5 – “What is said” is an intentional part of an ideal author. The event of what is said, that is, the speech-act updates the language system codes, but also provokes a meaning. The discourse is understood as meaning;
6 – To mean is the intent of the propositional content, the author's intention. “The utterance meaning points back towards the utterer’s meaning thanks to the self-reference of discourse to itself as an event.” (Ricoeur, 1976, p.25)

7 – Such “meaning” gives to the speech the characteristic of being an object. Because the propositional content (and, obviously, their connectors) it is possible to engage in the discourse in a non-psychological way, but purely semantic. The intention is in the phrase itself, independent of a psychological notion of intention;

8 - The semantic notion overlaps a psychological concept of intention because an individual experience is not transferred to another except through the communication act, and never fully, just as meaning: “my experience cannot directly become your experience. An event belonging to one stream of consciousness cannot be transferred as such into another stream of consciousness. (...) The experience as experienced, as lived, remains private, but its sense, its meaning, becomes public. (Ricoeur, 1976, p.27 - 28).

9 - The intention of the speaker in this semantic and non-psychological approach is called locutionary act which is always accompanied by the illocutionary act (an act performed in saying something) and perlocutionary (effect by saying something);

10 - Since the discourse is always addressed to someone, it will promote a dialogue (an interlocutionary act);

11 - Even though the propositional content being intentional, there is still the problem of ‘misunderstanding’. How to reduce the polysemy of words in the discourse? Still, how to identify or signify the communicability of the illocutionary act and the perlocutionary act? The illocutionary act is difficult to identify since it is revealed in gestures, tone of voice, etc... The perlocutionary act (to fright in saying, to seduce in saying, etc…) is the least communicable of the speech act.

12 - In short, “the utterance meaning – in the sense of propositional content – is the ‘objective’ side of this meaning. The utterer’s meaning – in the threefold sense of the self-reference of the sentence, the illocutionary dimension of the speech act, and the intention of recognition by the hearer – is the ‘subjective’ side of the meaning.” (Ricoeur, 1976, p.31). “Language is not a world of its own. It is not even a world. But because we are in the world, because we are affected by situations, and because we navigate through the understanding in such situations, we have something to say, we have the experience to bring to the language” (Ricoeur, 1976, p.32).

13 - The speech has meaning and reference: the sentence allows the identification of what is said and about what is spoken. The reference is a reference to reality and a reference to the speaker.

The Symbol

According to Ricoeur (2008), the most common characteristic of all languages is the polysemy of words which evokes more than one meaning for particular signs. Polysemy is part of a given sign – which is the unit of semiotics – and its interpretation is performed more or less clearly depending on the context in which the polysemic sign is used. Such “sensitivity to context” (Ricoeur, 2008, p.25) is an important element of the polysemic nature of language, and it is an eminently hermeneutic task:

(...) The use of contexts involves, in turn, an activity of discernment which is exercised in the concrete exchange of messages between interlocutors, and which is modeled on the interplay of question and answer. This activity of discernment is properly called the interpretation; it consists in recognizing which relatively univocal
message the speaker has constructed on the polysemic basis of the common lexicon. (Ricoeur, 2008, p.25)

But polysemy may reveal that a sign is actually a symbol, i.e., a sign that evokes a double meaning and purposeful, which is reached from the first direction (the literal meaning) of the sign, but it takes to a second and figurative sense (Ricoeur, 1978). At this point, there is a division between what Ricoeur calls (i) technical signs, which refer to what we actually want to say, and (ii) symbolic signs, which are “opaque”, and points to a second meaning, deeper, and rescued by analogy: “the weight of decision making”, for example, can be understood by “the decision as a burden”. In the text Hermeneutics of Symbols and Philosophical Reflection, Ricoeur (1978) outlines a general theory of the symbol, which is accompanied by reflections on a specific set of symbols: the symbolism of evil. This symbolism of evil serves him well to expose the notion of double meanings of the symbol, since evil is always exposed from a set of rituals of confession given by religion:

Whether we are dealing with the stain image in the magical conception of evil as pollution, or with deviation images of the crooked path, of transgression, of wandering or error, in the more ethical conception of sin, or with the weight image of a burden in the more interiorized experience of guilt – in all these cases the symbol of evil is constituted by starting from something which has a first-level meaning and is borrowed from the experience of nature – of contact, of man’s orientation in space - that is the symbol of evil. (Ricoeur, 1978, p.244)

From this work two important observations can be derived: (i) an attempt to a reflection of the symbol starts from a “middle point”, i.e “(...) starts from the fullness of language and of meaning already there.” (Ricoeur, 1978, p.242). What will be interpreted from the symbol is what has already been said and, somehow, everything has been said about the symbol. The language has already held in the symbol, instead of the sentence which always needs the event occurrence in order to allow and enable interpretation. The symbol has the meaning already being charged even before it is realized as a specific event. The interpretation of the symbol, in this case “(...) it wants to be thought, not pre-suppositionless, but in and with all its presuppositions. Its first problem [A/N: the interpretation] is not how to get started but, from the midst of speech, to recollect itself.” (Ricoeur, 1978, p.242); (ii) the problem of the symbol also raises an ontological reflection: “(...) if we raise the problem of symbol now, at this period of history, we do so in connection with certain traits of our 'modernity' and as a rejoinder to this modernity.” (Ricoeur, 1978, p.243). The symbol promotes the mediation between the being and the real, and it is a specific invention made by the man forged in an attempt to understand the real (Gagnebin, 1997). It is worth noting that this relationship is always a dialectical relationship since the man also understands himself from the symbol. To the interpretation of the discourse, there other methodological implications: “‘Symbol gives rise to thought.’ This maxim that I find so appealing says two things. The symbol gives: I do not posit the meaning, the symbol gives it; but what it gives is something for thought, something to think about” (Ricoeur, 1978, p.243).

From Discourse to Hermeneutics
As quoted above, Paul Ricoeur perceives and expresses the hermeneutic problem as a “(…) theory of operations of understanding in their relation to the interpretation of texts”. Besides, Ricoeur (1974, p.95) says that “(…) the main problem of hermeneutics is that of interpretation. (…) but interpretation with two qualifications: one concerning its scope or field of application, the other its epistemological specificity”. To achieve its goals, Ricoeur (2008) rescues a hermeneutics history in order to promote its deregionalization, that is, a shift from an interpretation theory of biblical and classical texts to an onto-epistemological philosophy. Such shift can only be realized through an understanding of language (and attempt to put the hermeneutic problem in the entire language problem) and it most basic characteristic: the problem of polysemy “(...) which involves the 'game' between the speaker and the listener, in a specific socio-historical context, that seeks to produce and unambiguous meaning of the speech.” (Pegino, 2006, p.37). When such game moves from the spoken to writing language it demands special care. For Ricoeur, the special attention to the writing language occurs in the first act of deregionalization with Schleiermacher's hermeneutics, which seeks to reconcile classic philology and exegesis of sacred texts as objects of the same theory, especially from the identification of two general elements: the romantic and the critic. “Critical refers to the establishment of universal rules of understanding, (…) and romantic in sense of allows to hermeneutics the (false) possibility to ‘understand the author better than himself’” (PEGINO, 2006, p.39). The Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics, however, do not solve the ontological and the epistemological hermeneutic problem. According to Ricoeur (2008) the solution of this problem begins with Heidegger concept of being-in-the-world. It is the philosophical shift: no longer being-with-others, but being-in-the world, i.e., the primacy of understanding the life before understanding the text, and the idea that there is a being-in-being instead of the dichotomous subject-and-object. The ontological implications of these statements are evident.

With Gadamer, is placed the notion of a being that is exposed to his own history in such a way that the objectification becomes an unreachable goal (Ricoeur, 2008). In fact, how to target a phenomenon that is part of the individual? In this case, the possibility to knowledge production about the world is granted by the concept of alienating distanciation, which means the ability to consciously ‘leaving’ a particular historical context. At this point, from this not-resolved opposition between belonging and alienation proposed by Gadamer that Ricoeur begins to build his own understanding of the hermeneutical task. This opposition between alienation and belonging in the Gadamer’s hermeneutics leads, inevitably, to a dilemma: “(...) either we adopt the methodological attitude and lose the ontological density of the reality we study, or we adopt the attitude or truth and must then renounce the objectivity of the human sciences” (Ricoeur, 2008, p50). The overcoming of this dilemma occurs through the text, which allows both the critical distanciation and the objective notion: “The text is, for me, much more than a particular case of intersubjective communication: it is the paradigm of distanciation in communication” (Ricoeur, 2008, p.52). This problem of objective distanciation from the text itself is organized by Ricoeur (2008) in five statements:

1 - The realization of language as discourse.

The Sausurre’s division between langue and parole removed the discourse as a scientific object and promoted a “more scientific” system. The finiteness of the code of a langue gives the system a predictability and controllability characteristic, since a code as a unit in a system only makes sense within the system itself, as a result of relationships only with other codes in a finite structure, in that all the relations among them occur inside the system and have no possible relationship out of it. Thus, language becomes a 'place' almost completely independent of the socio-historical context to which it belongs. However, when discourse – as an event – occurs gains characteristic of universality with the propositional content (the identification and predicate) and is recovered as a potential object of science: if
the language is made up of signs that refer to other signs within the same system, the speech is an event since it speaks about something, and speaks about a world it purports to describe (Ricoeur, 1976). While the speech occurs as an event it is understood as meaning, and at this point it stops being a mere evanescent event (which hermeneutic tries to understand is not the event itself, but the remaining significance) to intermediate a dialectical relationship between what one says and what one understands. To understand the speech also means ‘say’ something about what was ‘said’, and in doing so means to introduce three of speech acts: the propositional or locutionary act (the act of saying), the illocutionary act (what we do while saying), and the perlocutionary act (or, what we do because of speaking). If it is possible meaning the the “said as such”, i.e., if the propositional content was externalized, it is liable to be redeemed, written, rewritten, translated, and from a limited list of grammatical possibilities, re-meaning. Here what means objective distanciation: “(...) is the distanciation of the saying in the said” (Ricoeur, 2008, p.55).

2 - The realization of discourse as structured work.

A speech is a simple consequence greater than the sentence. Indeed, how should it be, a discourse consists of sentences. The submission of a speech to a specific encoding (called a literary genre) as a story, an essay, a poem, a novel, gives it the character of work. The work is a "(...) sequence longer than the sentence; it raises a new problem of understanding, relative to the finite and closed totality which constitutes the work” (Ricoeur, 2008, p.58). The work has a particular style concerning who performs it, besides “(...) the inscription of discourse in writing involves submitting language to rules of composition and formation (codification) such that it is transformed through labor into a story, poem(...)” (Topping, 2007, p.34) and so on... It is, moreover, a speech becomes a work as the result of an action and reflection (praxis), but not without causing new problems for hermeneutics: “by introducing the categories of production and labour into the dimension of discourse, the notion of work appears as a practical mediation between irrationality of the event and rationality of meaning” (Ricoeur, 2008, p.59). The “new” problem cited above refers to the two dialectic poles between event and meaning that occurs in the work. From now on, the work becomes an independent mediator of the author and reader. The writing allows the objective distanciation while the structure of the work allows the objectification.

3 – The relation of speaking to writing

According to Ricoeur (2008, p.62), “(...) writing renders the text autonomous with respect to the intention of the author. What the text signifies no longer coincides with what the author meant”. It is important to emphasize that autonomy occurs only in relation to psychological significance and not necessarily the textual significance. The writing text also has a type of semantic autonomy, since it allows re-meanings in different socio-historical contexts. The historical moment of the author may not necessarily be the socio-historical moment of the reader. This autonomy is a feature that allows the distance, but remembering that this distance “(...) is not the product of methodology and hence something superfluous and parasitical; rather, it is constitutive of the phenomenon of the text as writing. At the same time, it is the condition of interpretation” (Ricoeur, 2008, p.63).

4 – The work of discourse as the projection of a world

At this point, it is possible to say without further concerns that the speech refers to life and expresses its meaning. The notion of reference is useful in that it seeks to address a claim to truth, to say something that is in the “time-space network”, which is also the place of the speakers. This reference is the “here and now” (Ricoeur, 2008). This common ground that connects interlocutors and this “here and now” that submits them to a network of more or less
univocal meaning no longer exists in the “world of the text”. In fact, the reality can be destroyed with the world of text (for example, with the fictional or mythological works). However, the reality that ceases to exist in a fictional work is rebuilt on another level. If this world of meaning is sufficiently intelligible to the reader, it opens a second level of meaning and reaches up another world of things for him. “If we can no longer define the hermeneutics in terms of the search for the psychological intentions of another person which are concealed behind the text, and if we do not want to reduce interpretation to the dismantling of structures (...) then what remains to be interpreted? I shall say: to interpret is to explicate the type of being-in-the-world unfolded in front of the text” (Ricoeur, 2008, p.65).

5 – Discourse and the work of discourse as the mediation of self-understanding.

The interpretation of the text takes place in a dialectical tension between explanation and understanding. This interpretation works mediating the relation between the individual and the world (being-in-the-world). As part of a structured work, the discourse may appear in a specific situation in which the world of meaning that connects interlocutors may not exist. Thus, in this specific work, the individual may recreate his own subjectivity granting meanings to this specific work. This act of understanding in front of the work means that “(...) the reader’s response is not to the meaning; it is the meaning’ of a literary text” (Ricoeur, 2008, p.68). At this point, the hermeneutical task of entering into an ontological problem is completed since the world of the text is itself a significant mediator of understanding the world of the subject (PEGINO, 2006). “In contrast to the tradition of the cogito and to the pretension of the subject to know itself by immediate intuition, it must be said that we understand ourselves only by the long detour of the signs of humanity deposited in cultural works” (Ricoeur, 2008, p.68).

Conclusions

Ricoeur’s hermeneutics tries to solve either its theoretical and methodological aporias: (i) one relating to the ontological plane, the plane of “being-in-the-world”, becoming aware of the existence of a being which comprises an objective world by giving meanings to it, (ii) other relating to the epistemological level, the level of objective distanciation with the text, becoming aware of the existence of a dialectical tension between explanation and understanding, (iii) and, finally the last, relating to the methodological level, with the fundamental distinction between semantics and semiotics; from the distinction of the simplest units of language (the sign and the sentence) to work as a structured work as a result of subjective praxis of the being. Both ontology and epistemology of Ricoeur’s hermeneutic have its basis in the dialectic of explanation and understanding. The mediation by the text allows the objectification of the world by the fact that the text itself do not belong either the reader or the author. It is the paradigm of objective distanciation on communication. At this point, we can reestablish the ontological notion of Ricoeur’s hermeneutic from a dialectical relationship with its own epistemology, since to understand (the problem of being) is to understand in front of the text and through the text. The subject has not an immediate intuition that enables him to understand himself as a being. Actually, this is only possible through the text and, more precisely, the “text” of the world.

With the world of the text, the ontological problem is set before the epistemological problem, not as ranked categories, but as an ontology that is placed inside the epistemological problem. However, one might think there is a gap in the ontological problem: the critical perspective is only possible by the objectification of the text, but the writing text is also the text of the world, a broader metaphor. The language as a fundamental element that intermediate the relations between the subject and the world is accomplished as a discourse and the discourse is accomplished as an event. The event, in its turn, has a specific
temporality and is expressed by someone about something (and reveals a being toward the world). Moreover, the understanding of a speech may be taken only as meaning.

It is possible, after all, to use the Ricoeur’s hermeneutics for an interpretation of organizational narratives. Furthermore, it is possible to use the Ricoeur’s hermeneutics to an interpretation of organizational phenomena. The organization, moreover, was a privileged place for forging its own symbolic system, and includes relations of domination and psychosocial controlling among its various members. Its narratives, its speeches, serving as guiding to the action of its various authors impose standards of conducts and behaviors acceptable to its legitimating ordering, selecting the “good behaviors” and “good conducts”. The organization is a broad field of discourse and is built on myths and heroes, consolidating rituals and solidifying the actions of its members. The crucial point here and that impacts positively on the search for alternatives frameworks to discourse analysis, is that the organization always tries (and with a high degree of success) to build its systems and its symbolic narratives.

To the organizational studies field, such symbolic systems and narratives may be useful as a starting point for the investigation of social relations that occur within organizations. The issues surrounding this field are actually much wider and allow the use of many approaches and methods. The aim of this study was to present an alternative to these hermeneutic approaches, demonstrating how this alternative, built on meticulous work of Paul Ricoeur, solve its problems relating to internal aporias of the method and set itself as an ontological and epistemological view with a dense methodological framework.

References


